Google's €890 Million DMA Fine in 2026: Self-Preferencing, Anti-Steering, and What It Means for Advertisers and Brands

What the Commission Decided on 23 July 2026

On 23 July 2026, the European Commission announced that it had taken two decisions finding non-compliance by Google with the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and imposed a combined fine of €890 million on the company. The two decisions address separate conduct on two different Google surfaces: the way Google ranks its own services within Google Search, and the restrictions Google placed on app developers within Google Play. Together they mark one of the most consequential enforcement actions the EU has taken against a designated gatekeeper under the DMA to date.

The DMA is not an advertising rulebook in the way that Google's own ad policies are. It is an ex-ante competition regulation that imposes obligations on a small number of very large "gatekeeper" platforms, aiming to keep digital markets contestable and fair. When the Commission finds that a gatekeeper has breached those obligations, it can order the conduct to stop and levy substantial fines. That is precisely what happened here: the Commission found two breaches, fined Google €890 million in total, and ordered the company to bring the non-compliance to an end.

"Google gives preferential treatment to its own services, including shopping, hotels, transport and sports results, over those of third parties in Google Search.
— European Commission, Digital Markets Act decision, 23 July 2026"

This briefing sets out how the €890 million splits between the two findings, what the self-preferencing and anti-steering conduct involved, how the DMA's enforcement framework works in general terms, and — most importantly for a marketing audience — what advertisers and brands should take from the decision. It is not legal advice, and it deliberately keeps the DMA (a competition regulation) distinct from the EU's content-focused regimes. For the wider EU regulatory picture, see the European Union compliance guide, and track how the remedies evolve on the Policy Change Tracker.

How the €890 Million Breaks Down

The headline figure is a single number, but it represents two separate findings with two separate penalties. Reading them apart matters, because the conduct, the affected surface and the likely remedies differ between them.

The Two Decisions at a Glance

Two points are worth emphasising before we look at each finding in detail. First, the two penalties are close in size — €460 million and €430 million — which signals that the Commission treated both breaches as serious rather than viewing one as a minor add-on to the other. Second, the Commission did not only fine Google; it ordered the company to bring the non-compliance to an end. In DMA enforcement, the behavioural remedy that follows a decision often matters more to the market than the fine itself, because it changes how the platform must operate going forward. For advertisers and brands, that forward-looking remedy is the part to watch, since it can reshape the surfaces they rely on. Map where your own reliance on those surfaces sits with the Legal Compliance Scan.

Self-Preferencing in Google Search

The larger of the two penalties, €460 million, addresses self-preferencing in Google Search. In the Commission's terms, Google gave preferential treatment to its own services — including shopping, hotels, transport and sports results — over those of third parties, displaying them more prominently within the results page.

What Self-Preferencing Means Here

Self-preferencing is the practice by which a platform that both operates a marketplace and competes within it uses its control of the marketplace to advantage its own offerings. In the search context, the Commission found that Google displayed its own vertical services more prominently — for example at the top of the results page, or with enhanced visuals and filters that third-party services did not receive. The concern is not that Google shows shopping, travel or sports information; it is that comparable third-party services were placed at a structural disadvantage in how they could appear and be found.

• The affected verticals: the decision names shopping, hotels, transport and sports results as areas where Google's own services received preferential treatment in Search.
• The mechanism: prominence. Placement at the top of the page and enhanced presentation — richer visuals, filters and formats — can materially shift where users click.
• Who is affected: comparison and vertical services that compete with Google's own units, and the businesses that depend on being discoverable through them.
• The remedy direction: the Commission ordered Google to bring the conduct to an end, which points toward changes in how the results page ranks and presents Google's own versus third-party services.

For brands, the practical significance is that the composition of the Google Search results page is now subject to a competition remedy. If Google must give comparable treatment to third-party shopping, travel and comparison services, the mix of what appears "above the fold" — and how much of the page Google's own units occupy — can change. That has direct implications for organic discoverability and for how paid placements sit alongside organic and self-preferenced units. E-commerce and direct-to-consumer brands in particular should re-examine how much of their traffic depends on Google's own shopping and comparison surfaces; the sector view in the e-commerce and DTC compliance guide frames that dependency, and unfamiliar terms are defined in the compliance glossary.

Anti-Steering on Google Play

The second penalty, €430 million, concerns anti-steering restrictions on Google Play. The Commission found that Google prevented app developers from freely communicating alternative offers to their users and from directing them to options outside the app, and it pointed to the level of the steering-related fees Google charged and the length of the charging period as central to the breach.

What Anti-Steering Means Here

"Steering" is the ability of a business to tell its own customers about other ways to transact — a cheaper price on the developer's own website, a subscription available outside the app store, or an alternative distribution channel. The DMA requires gatekeepers to let business users steer their customers freely and without charge for the communication itself. The Commission found that Google's Play restrictions, together with the fees it applied to steering and the duration over which those fees were charged, went beyond what the DMA permits, constraining developers' ability to communicate freely with their own users.

• The restriction: app developers were prevented from freely communicating alternative offers and directing users to options outside the app.
• The fee dimension: the Commission specifically identified the level of the steering-related fees charged by Google and the length of the charging period as elements of the non-compliance.
• Who is affected: app developers who distribute through Google Play and want to point users to cheaper or alternative purchase paths, and by extension the users who might have accessed those offers.
• The remedy direction: the Commission ordered the conduct to end, pointing toward changes in how Google permits and prices steering on Play.

For brands and advertisers that operate apps, or that rely on in-app funnels for subscriptions and purchases, this finding is directly operational. If Play must allow freer steering, the economics of routing users to owned channels — a brand's own website, a lower-priced direct subscription — can improve. Marketing and growth teams should revisit their app monetisation and cross-channel strategy in light of a remedy that may loosen these constraints. Standardise how you review these platform obligations with the AI Compliance Audit, and keep the Play policy framework in view through the Google Ads policy guide as related surfaces evolve.

The DMA Enforcement Framework

To read this decision correctly, it helps to understand the general enforcement framework the DMA provides, while keeping case-specific figures separate from the statutory ceilings. The €890 million is the fine actually imposed; the framework below describes the powers the DMA gives the Commission in general, not case-specific calculations.

The Powers Behind the Fine

• Ex-ante obligations: the DMA sets out obligations that designated gatekeepers must follow by default, rather than requiring the Commission to prove harm case by case as in classic antitrust. Self-preferencing limits and steering freedoms are among those obligations.
• Fines up to 10% of worldwide turnover: as a general feature of the DMA, the Commission can impose fines of up to 10% of a gatekeeper's total worldwide annual turnover for non-compliance, and up to 20% for repeated infringements. These are statutory ceilings, not the figures applied in this case.
• Periodic penalty payments: the DMA also allows periodic penalty payments to compel compliance where a gatekeeper continues non-compliant conduct. This is a general enforcement tool, again distinct from the €890 million fine announced here.
• Orders to end conduct: beyond fines, the Commission can order the gatekeeper to bring the infringing conduct to an end, which is the forward-looking remedy that reshapes how the platform must operate.

It is important to keep this DMA action separate from the EU's earlier antitrust decisions against Google in the advertising-technology space. Those were competition cases under the general antitrust rules; this is an ex-ante enforcement action under the DMA's specific gatekeeper obligations. Conflating them misreads both the legal basis and the likely remedies. It is equally important not to attach case-specific numbers — a particular compliance window or a specific percentage of turnover — to this decision unless the Commission states them, because the official announcement did not. For how EU regulation as a whole interacts with platform operations, the European Union compliance guide gives the broader map, noting that the DMA (competition) and the content-focused regimes are distinct instruments.

What This Means for Advertisers and Brands

Advertisers and brands are not the subject of this decision — Google is — but they are downstream of it. The value of the changes lies in how remedies reshape the surfaces marketers depend on: the Google Search results page and the Google Play distribution channel. The practical response is to prepare for structural change rather than to treat the fine as a one-off headline.

The Strategic Implications

• The SERP composition may shift: if Google must give comparable treatment to third-party shopping, travel and comparison services, the balance of the results page — how much space Google's own units occupy, what appears at the top — can change, altering organic discoverability and the context around paid placements.
• App steering economics may loosen: if Play must permit freer steering, brands with apps may gain more room to route users to owned channels and lower-priced direct offers, improving the economics of in-app funnels.
• Channel concentration is a risk: the decision is a reminder that heavy dependence on a single gatekeeper's surfaces carries structural risk. Diversifying discovery and distribution reduces exposure to any one platform's changes, whether driven by regulation or by the platform's own policy.
• Remedies unfold over time: the market effect comes from the behavioural remedy, which is implemented and refined after the decision. The composition of Search and the rules of Play may change gradually, so the right posture is continuous monitoring rather than a single reaction.

None of this requires a marketing team to change a single ad account setting today, because the DMA does not regulate advertisers directly. What it requires is strategic attention: understanding that the surfaces you rely on are subject to a competition remedy, and building a plan that is resilient to how those surfaces may change. Model where your discovery and distribution are concentrated with the Legal Compliance Scan, and monitor how the remedies land on the Policy Change Tracker. Treat this as an early read on a market in motion, not a settled end state.

Advertiser and Brand Action Checklist

• [ ] Separated the DMA decision from Google's advertising policies — understood that the DMA regulates Google, not advertisers directly
• [ ] Noted the two findings: €460M for Search self-preferencing, €430M for Play anti-steering, €890M total
• [ ] Assessed how much of your organic discovery depends on Google's own shopping, travel and comparison units
• [ ] Reviewed how much of your app monetisation depends on in-app purchase paths versus owned channels
• [ ] Identified single-platform concentration risk and mapped diversification options
• [ ] Kept this DMA action distinct from earlier EU adtech antitrust decisions
• [ ] Avoided attaching unconfirmed case-specific figures (compliance windows, turnover percentages) to this decision
• [ ] Set up monitoring for how the behavioural remedies reshape Search and Play
• [ ] Documented your platform-dependency assumptions as a baseline to revisit
• [ ] Verified the current position against the European Commission's official DMA decision page